Abstract-Frequency offset (FO) refers to the difference in the operating frequencies of two radio oscillators. Failure to compensate for the FO may lead to decoding errors, particularly in OFDM systems. To correct the FO, wireless standards append a publicly known preamble to every frame before transmission. In this paper, we demonstrate how an adversary can exploit the known preamble structure of OFDM-based wireless systems, particularly IEEE802.11a/g/n/ac, to launch a very stealth (low energy/duty cycle) reactive jamming attack against the FO estimation mechanism. In this attack, the adversary quickly detects a transmitted OFDM frame and subsequently jams a tiny part of the preamble that is used for FO estimation at the legitimate receiver. By optimizing the energy and structure of the jamming signal and accounting for frame detection timing errors and unknown channel parameters, we empirically show that the adversary can induce a bit error rate close to 0:5, making the transmission practically irrecoverable. Such vulnerability to FO jamming exists even when the frame is shielded by efficient channel coding. We evaluate the FO estimation attack through simulations and USRP experimentation. We also propose three approaches to mitigate such an attack.
INTRODUCTION
C OMMUNICATION between two wireless devices involves several concerted functions at the physical (PHY) layer, including time synchronization, carrier frequency offset (FO) correction, channel estimation, channel coding, modulation, interleaving, and others [2] . PHY-layer functions are designed to combat oscillator imperfections and wireless channel impairments, and to decode wireless signals that are corrupted by a limited amount of interference. However, wireless transmissions still remain vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, commonly referred to as jamming.
One measure of the effectiveness of a jamming attack is its duty cycle, i.e., the fraction of the frame that needs to be jammed so that the frame is discarded at the receiver (Rx) [3] , [4] . This metric is directly related to the jammer's distance to the Rx, energy budget, and the ability to disrupt concurrent transmissions. A jammer that remains active for a longer period can corrupt more bits and defeat stronger error correction codes (ECCs), at the expense of higher energy consumption and fewer targeted communications. This more potent jammer is also easier to detect [5] , localize, and physically remove using jammer localization methods [4] .
In this paper, we investigate an extremely low duty cycle jamming model that is facilitated by public knowledge of the frame structure and PHY-layer functions. Our goal is to demonstrate how an adversary can inflict the highest possible number of decoding errors at the Rx, without jamming the corresponding header or payload symbols. PHY-layer standards usually employ publicly known sequences, known as preambles, at the beginning of a frame to acquire important communication parameters, such as the transmission timing, channel, and FO [2] . These parameters are used to align received symbols. An adversary may exploit the publicity of the preamble to construct a reactive jamming attack and target the estimation of these critical parameters. In particular, we demonstrate the feasibility of an energy-efficient and low duty cycle attack against the FO estimation process of IEEE 802.11 OFDM-based devices (including 802.11a, .11g, .11n, .11ac, and 11ah), all of which exploit the same preamble structure. Our results can be extended to other OFDM-based systems, including 802.16e/m (WiMAX), LTE, and 5G.
The jamming of OFDM systems has recently been the subject of extensive research (e.g., [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] ). These works often consider vulnerabilities in time synchronization or susceptibility to inter-carrier interference (ICI). For example, the authors in [8] proposed several jamming attacks against OFDM time synchronization, including barrage attacks, false preamble timing, and preamble warping. In the barrage attack, white noise is transmitted to decrease the SNR during synchronization. In false preamble timing, the jammer forges a preamble to fool the Rx about the true start time of the frame. A similar technique was used in [9] against an 802.11b Rx to hamper the network throughput. Preamble warping tries to destroy the time-domain correlation (used for time acquisition) within the preamble.
Frequency Offset Estimation Attacks
In OFDM systems, frequency synchronization errors are more devastating than timing errors [13] . When two radios are tuned to the same target frequency, their oscillators cannot be exactly aligned to that frequency due to hardware imperfections. FO is the inherent difference between the actual frequencies of these two oscillators. In OFDM, FO is usually normalized to the inter-subcarrier frequency interval, called subcarrier spacing. Without frequency synchronization, the performance of OFDM degrades severely because all subcarriers will move away from their expected frequencies, resulting in subcarriers' orthogonality violation, ICI [13] , and channel estimation errors [1] , [14] .
To appreciate the significance of correct FO estimation, we conduct a simulation experiment in which a frame containing a bitmap image is transmitted between two nodes. Fig. 1 depicts the effect of a small FO estimation error (0:32 percent of subcarrier spacing) on the transmitted image (left) when 48 subcarriers are used at a rate of 6 Mbps. The received image (right) exhibits noticeable degradation in the form of image block misplacement. In practice, FO can be even larger than the subcarrier spacing [2] .
A few jamming schemes have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [7] , [9] , [10] ) with the goal of inflicting ICI. Phase warping and differential scrambling attacks [10] consider the preamble structure of Schmidl and Cox [15] , which is different from the one used in 802.11 OFDMbased standards, and in essence try to alter preamble symbols in a heuristic fashion without providing any success guarantees. Gummadi et al. [9] showed the vulnerability of 802.11a clock (frequency) synchronization to a certain narrow-band jamming pattern that interferes with the entire preamble. In [7] the jammer transmits multiple asynchronous subcarriers to cause ICI in an OFDM symbol. These attacks may fail if robust ECC, interleaving methods, or additional FO estimation mechanisms are employed at the Rx.
Contributions
We design an energy-efficient jamming attack that interferes with a small portion of the preamble, i.e., one of the parts used for FO estimation, and causes one or two units shift of the subcarrier indices (e.g., every subcarrier takes the position of its next/previous subcarrier). To make this design possible, the adversary (Eve) must first estimate the FO between the legitimate transmitter (Alice) and intended receiver (Bob), and then quickly detect the transmission of a target frame. We provide an adaptive frame detection method to facilitate fast detection at Eve. The superposition of the jamming signal with the preamble are designed to delude Bob into estimating an FO that is sufficiently far from the true FO, so that Bob decodes wrong symbols, i.e., the symbols of adjacent subcarriers. The idea is to come up with a structure that is similar to the actual preamble so as to control the FO embedded in the jamming sequence. The superposition of these two signals with different FOs at the Rx achieves sufficient FO estimation error. We derive the amount of FO estimation error needed to guarantee erroneous OFDM demodulation and accordingly, develop an optimal attack strategy. To ensure that the jamming signal is independent of the Alice-Bob channel parameters (which are unknown to Eve), we propose a pairing scheme for the jamming sequence. The jamming attack should also account for timing errors in frame detection at Eve while keeping the jamming signal channel-independent. For this purpose, a chaining scheme is designed on top of the pairing scheme to account for other possible frame start times.
Consequently, not only the channel estimation is automatically corrupted at Bob, but more importantly, all the frequency subcarriers are shifted forward or backward. Hence, Bob will have a shifted version of the bitstream transmitted in every OFDM symbol. Combined with a faulty channel estimation and thus demodulation errors, the bits become irrecoverable. We further optimize the power of this jamming attack and experimentally evaluate its performance on a USRP testbed. In contrast to previous attacks on the frame preamble, ours in essence does not aim at necessarily causing ICI. It is also different from the attacks in [7] , [9] , [10] in that it is channel-independent and energy-efficient, i.e., only a small portion of the preamble is jammed irrespective of the jammer's location. This shortlived attack lasts for less than 3 ms per frame (equivalent to, for example, about 0:5 percent of 802.11a's maximum frame duration when the data rate is at its highest value). Note that this is even shorter than the duration of an OFDM symbol (4 ms). Our proposed attack also disarms all the provisioned FO estimation methods by just efficiently defeating one of them. Our work focuses on the 802.11 OFDM-based wireless systems, and efficiently exploits their FO vulnerability for the first time.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on frame detection, FO estimation, and channel estimation in OFDM-based 802.11 standards. The system model, assumptions, and evaluation metrics are given in Section 3. The proposed attack and the optimal jamming strategy are presented in Section 4 and related issues are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 demonstrates the effectiveness of the attack through simulations and experiments. Finally, we propose possible remedies and provide a summary of existing attacks in Sections 7 and 8, respectively.
FRAME DETECTION AND FO CORRECTION IN OFDM SYSTEMS
In OFDM, a bitstream is split into several substreams, each of which is digitally modulated and transmitted over one of the orthogonal frequency channels (subcarriers Fig. 2 ). To prevent ICI, the Rx uses the PHYlayer preamble to estimate the FO (same for all subcarriers) and adjust the subcarriers to their expected orthogonal frequency bins. If the offset is less than half of the frequency distance between the subcarriers, the Rx can safely identify the frequency bin that each subcarrier belongs to.
Every PHY-layer frame starts with a preamble. In OFDM-based 802.11 systems, the preamble begins with two essential fields (see Fig. 3 ). The first field contains 10 identical short training sequences (STSs), which represent 10 replicas of a particular periodic function with period STS ¼ 0:8 ms. The second field consists of two long training sequences (LTSs), which represent two cycles of another known periodic function with period LTS ¼ 4 STS , plus a 1:6 ms cyclic prefix (GI). 1 The periodic function in an STS is constructed by superposing only the subcarriers whose frequencies are integer multiples of 4f D . As a result, the minimum subcarrier spacing between any two STS-enabled subcarriers is 4f D , and hence their period is STS ¼ LTS =4. STSs are used for frame detection and coarse FO correction. LTSs, on the other hand, employ all the data subcarriers and are used for channel estimation and fine-tuning the coarse STS-based FO estimation.
We briefly explain the channel estimation process in OFDM-based 802.11 systems because it is affected by the coarse FO estimation. LTSs are used for channel estimation, the task of estimating the response of the channel, because they are supposed to be almost FO-free after STS-based FO correction. There are two general approaches for channel estimation: Frequency domain and time domain [13] . In both approaches, the a priori known LTS symbols are compared with the received symbols in order to estimate the impulse or frequency response that results in the minimum mean-square-error (MSE). The MSE can grow quadratically as a function of the FO estimation error [14] .
FO Estimation and Correction
Let Df be the actual frequency offset between a transmitter (Tx) and an Rx. This FO translates into a phase offset of D'ðtÞ ¼ 2pDft for the received signal, where t is the time elapsed since the start of the transmission. In addition to causing ICI, a linear increase in the phase offset during the LTSs due to FO results in incorrect channel phaser estimation. To compensate for channel impairments, the inverse of the phaser is multiplied to the received samples. As a result, all received modulated samples will be rotated equally on the constellation map, leading to more bit errors. Beyond channel estimation errors, accumulation of the phase offset can significantly change the phase of some of the symbols, especially in long frames.
The de facto time-domain FO estimation method used in OFDM systems is the one proposed by Schmidl and Cox [15] . We consider it as a representative FO estimation scheme. It assumes that the channel does not change during the preamble transmission. Having a sequence r with two identical halves is the key idea in this method. It works as follows. Assume that each half of the sequence has L samples with sampling period of t s . Let r i be the ith sample of the sequence r, i ¼ 1; . . . ; 2L. So r i ¼ r Lþi . Ignoring the noise, this equality also holds for the corresponding samples at the Rx as long as there is no FO. However, with an FO of Df, the phase of r Lþi relative to r i is rotated by D'ðt s Þ ¼ 2pDfLt s . Multiplying the conjugate of r i (i.e., r Ã i ) by r Lþi , we obtain:
Taking into account the channel coefficient h i ¼ h Lþi and the noise terms, n i and n Lþi , the value of s i at the Rx, denoted by e s i , is:
where
Lþi has zero mean. To average out the n i 's, the estimated phase offset, f D', is measured over the summation of all thes i 's, i.e.,
where the notation ]ðxÞ indicates the phase of a complex quantity x. Thus, the estimated FO is: Fig. 4 shows an example of a sequence of length 2L ¼ 8 samples. The more samples are used to estimate f D', the more accurate the estimated FO is.
Regarding the phase of a complex number such as e s i , the Rx observes a value between Àp and p. In other words, the Rx cannot distinguish D' from D' AE 2kp in (4), for any integer k. The phase offset of 2p corresponds to 1. In MIMO-OFDM systems, these two fields are followed by additional training sequences for MIMO channel estimation [17] . Even after the LTS-based FO correction, a small residual FO may remain due to noise. This error is typically too small to cause ICI, but it gradually rotates the phase of the received symbols on the constellation map and may increase the BER, specially in the long frames. A predetermined subset of subcarriers with known values (called pilot subcarrier) are used to track and compensate for these small phase changes. Theoretically, there is no frequency range limitation for FO estimation in pilot subcarriers [13] . In addition, known pilot subcarriers can be used for tracking channel variations.
Frame Detection
For a typical wireless Rx, an increase in the received power is a first indication of a new frame. To verify whether this increase is indeed due to a transmitted 802.11a/g/n/ac frame and then time synchronize with it, the Rx checks for the existence of successive identical sequences of a preset length [15] . In Schmidl and Cox's frame detection method, the Rx considers two non-overlapping intervals, each of duration k STS microseconds (equivalently, kL samples, where k is an integer) to represent two identical halves of a sequence. For example, three STSs with t s ¼ 50 ns sample period (owing to the Nyquist rate of 20 MHz) result in L ¼ 48 samples. In the 802.11 standard, 1 k 5. The correlation between the samples' conjugate in the first interval (window) and the corresponding samples in the second one is computed. Let AðnÞ be the summation of these correlations when the first window starts at the nth sample of the whole sequence:
Using AðnÞ, a normalized timing metric, MðnÞ, is computed:
where EðnÞ ¼ def P LÀ1 i¼0 je s nþLþi j 2 is the received signal energy over the second window. MðnÞ is close to zero if either window does not contain any preamble sample. On the other hand, MðnÞ peaks when both windows contain only preamble samples. Ideally, MðnÞ should stay constant at the maximum value of 1, as long as both the windows are being moved inside the preamble boundaries. So the first time that MðnÞ hits the maximum is marked as the beginning of the frame. Because of noise, the maximum may occur later than the actual preamble start time. To account for this, the algorithm first findsM ¼ max n MðnÞ and then searches for the earliest time before the occurrence ofM with an M value greater than ð1 À ÞM, where 0 < < 1 is a system parameter. That time instant is taken as the beginning of the frame. Fig. 5 shows two examples of the smallest and largest possible window sizes in the 802.11a frame detection scheme. When L ¼ 80, the noise is averaged out, so the estimateM is more reliable. In contrast, when L ¼ 16, MðnÞ exhibits a higher fluctuation andM is less reliable, requiring a larger to decrease the probability of misdetecting the frame start time. Even though the sharp increase of MðnÞ makes room to increase , it is unclear how much increase is sufficient.
MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a link between Alice (the Tx) and Bob (the Rx). The adversary (Eve) is in the transmission ranges of both Alice and Bob. Alice transmits an 802.11 OFDM frame and Bob uses a few of the first STSs for frame detection. He chooses two of the last three STSs, in conformity with the standard (see Fig. 3 ) and employs the Schmidl and Cox method for FO estimation. Once Bob estimates the coarse FO using STSs and compensates for g Df s , he assumes, by default, that the residual FO is less than th l and then estimates it using LTSs. According to the 802.11 standard, Bob does not perform any kind of boundary check during the LTS-and pilot-based FO estimation processes.
Eve aims at irrecoverably corrupting Alice's frame at Bob using the lowest possible jamming effort. Eve is aware of the PHY-layer protocol and the FO correction mechanism at Bob. She makes no assumptions about the channel parameters or Alice's transmission power. If the oscillators are either stable or accurate, Eve initially eavesdrops on Alice's and Bob's preamble transmissions (e.g., data-ACK exchanges) for a while. Through averaging, she estimates their FOs relative to Eve, denoted by Df ae and Df be , respectively. 2 The metrics of interest are coarse and final estimated FOs at Bob, Symbol error rate (SER), the BER after demodulation but before decoding, and the jamming effort (defined as the jammer's duty cycle [3] ). These metrics will be studied with respect to the SNR, modulation scheme, and signal-to-jamming ratio (SJR) at Bob.
FREQUENCY OFFSET ESTIMATION ATTACK
In this section, we describe in detail an attack on the FO estimation. Eve launches this attack in two phases: (1) Eavesdropping on the channel to detect the start of Alice's frame transmission and acquire its timing information; and (2) jamming the last three STSs of the preamble, which are used for coarse FO estimation.
Phase 1: Adaptive Fast Frame Detection
To pinpoint the last three STSs in time and corrupt the FO estimation at Bob, Eve must detect Alice's frame and synchronize with its arrival at Bob. The detection should be fast enough to allow sufficient time for processing, switching to transmission mode, and jamming the last three STSs. Referring to the frame detection mechanism in Section 2, Eve chooses the minimum possible window size (one STS, L ¼ 16) and reduces the capture time to 2:5 STS ¼ 2 ms to make sure that at least the first two STSs are captured.
To account for the higher detection inaccuracy due to the small window size, Eve assumes that the actual start time belongs to the first V ¼ log 2 ðLÞ 3 sample indices i 0 ; i 1 ; . . . ; i V À1 that are greater than ð1 À ÞM and finds all of them, instead of just looking for the first one. She sets to a value less than 1=L, the contribution of a preamble sample pair in MðnÞ. This is an attempt to exclude the samples located more than one index before the actual frame start time. If there are less than V sample values greater than the threshold, Eve adaptively decreases the threshold by finding the smallest that guarantees the existence of V candidates. 
Phase 2: Preamble Jamming
Based on i 0 , Eve computes the arrival time of the last three STSs of the preamble and generates a jamming signal that would be aligned with those STSs. The energy-efficient jamming sequence is designed to defeat all STS-, LTS-, and pilot-based FO corrections without jamming the LTSs and pilot subcarriers. For this attack to be successful, Eve has to account for unknown channel parameters and frame-detection timing errors. More specifically, the jamming sequence is designed to achieve the following goals:
Forcing Bob to make a Destructive Error
By default, Bob assumes that the FO to be estimated using LTSs is less than th l . If Eve deceives Bob into erroneously push the FO beyond th l after receiving the STSs instead of reducing it, then she achieves her goal without needing to jam the LTSs. Without loss of generality, Eve assumes i 0 is the correct start time of the frame (we will relax this assumption later). Let Df eb ¼ ÀDf be and Df ab ¼ Df ae À Df be represent Bob's estimates of Eve-to-Bob and Alice-to-Bob FOs, respectively. Let D' ab , D' eb , and D' l ¼ p=4 be the phase offsets corresponding to Df ab , Df eb , and th l , respectively, after a single STS (0:8 ms). To cause incorrect FO estimation ( g Df s ) such that the updated FO after STSs (Df ab À g Df s ) is higher than th l , the following inequality should hold:
Figs. 6a and 6b show an example of such a situation in the polar coordinates and the frequency domain, respectively.
Eve's jamming signal needs to satisfy (7) . Let g be the Eve-to-Bob channel coefficient. We assume that during Eve's jamming period, g is the same for all the jamming samples that belong to the jamming sequence u, denoted by u i ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; 2L. Letr i ¼ hr i andũ i ¼ gu i . We consider two different approaches for generating the jamming sequence: 2. In general, oscillators exhibit numerous instabilities, due to aging, temperature, acceleration, ionizing radiation, power supply voltage, etc. Thus, the Rx must update the FO estimate on a per-frame basis, even if the frame sender is already known. This is specially the case with non-stable oscillators. In this case, Eve can perform FO estimation along with fast frame detection to optimally design the jamming signal for each frame (see Section 4.1).
3. The reason of this specific number will be explained in Section 4.2.3.
4. Eve may also apply the synchronization method in [18] to improve the detection accuracy.
1) Random noise:
A simple way to corrupt the FO estimation at Bob is to jam the last three STSs with a random signal. Recalculating the autocorrelation A at Bob after the superposition and ignoring the noise term in (2), we have:
The phase and amplitude of the second and third terms in (8) 
because not only they include random complex numbers u i , but also the phase and amplitude ofr i are unknown after traversing the Alice-to-Bob channel. Hence, f D' random may not satisfy (7), so FO jamming with a random signal cannot provide any FO distortion guarantees to beat LTSbased FO estimation.
2) Fake preamble: A more effective jamming approach that exploits both knowledge of the FO estimation algorithm and Df ab is to construct a fake preamble with "identical halves". For now, assume that the samples of the jamming signal u i ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; 2L can take any arbitrary value as long as the signal conforms to the protocol bandwidth requirement. The preamble phase warping attack in [10] is a special case of this approach, where the jamming signal is a random frequency-shifted version of an arbitrary fake preamble. The advantage of having identical halves is that we can control and carefully calculate a desired FO for u based on how Bob estimates Df ab . Here, we also note that the channel response between Eve and Bob does not change the FO. Before we explain how a desired FO (and hence Df eb ) is determined, consider the superposition of Alice's signal and Eve's jamming at Bob. Dropping the index i from (2) and ignoring the noise term, we have:
Thus, the estimated phase offset at Bob is:
Note that the phase estimation error ' e ¼ def ]B is a function of SJR and D' eb , and jamming will have no effect if ' e ¼ 0.
Upon calculating f D' and g Df s , Bob changes the FO for the rest of the frame to Df ab À g Df s . According to (7), Eve is successful if she can ensure that D' eb satisfies the following:
Eve can guarantee a desired ' e only if SJR! À1. Otherwise, even if she knows D' ab andũ and can also control D' eb , she has no control over other channel-dependent parameters in B. Specifically, the phase and amplitude ofr are channel-dependent and Eve cannot estimate the Aliceto-Bob channel coefficient h. That means that Eve is still unable to guarantee a successful attack, which is also the case in the preamble phase warping attack.
Designing a Channel-Independent Jamming Signal
To address the aforementioned challenge, Eve takes advantage of Alice's known preamble samples and the product sum in (3) to cancel out the terms with unknown phases. Eve first chooses L=2 non-overlapping pairs of samples. Without loss of generality, let Eve pair the samples in order and let (u 1 , u 2 ) be the first pair of samples in the jamming sequence. By knowing the preamble sample values at Alice, u 2 can be designed such that when Bob sums ups 1 ands 2 , all the terms that depend onr (excluding jrj) in the term B in (9) are eliminated. Thus,
which implies that
The requirement in (12) is similarly imposed on the rest of the even samples. We refer to this requirement as the pairing rule. Accordingly, the autocorrelation function A for this scheme, denoted by A fake , becomes:
Now A fake is a function of the difference between D' ab and D' eb only. So Eve can determine a desired value of D' eb in a way that makes j]CðD' eb À D' ab Þj > D' l , which satisfies (11).
Robustness to Errors in Frame Start Time
We now relax the assumption that Eve can precisely determine the true frame start time and consider a scenario in which she compiles a short list of possible frame start times besides i 0 , as explained in Section 4.1. Thus far, we have required the jamming sequence to have identical halves with a D' eb that satisfies (11) and the even samples to be a function of odd samples (pairing rule). Eve could still benefit from the remaining free, unassigned samples (i.e., odd samples) to cancel out channeldependent terms for other possible start times. We generalize the pairing technique to larger sets of samples and define the following chaining rule to account for V À 1 other start times i 1 ; i 2 ; . . . ; i V À1 . 5 5. Eve can precompute and then account for the propagation delays by timestamping the data-ACK exchanges between Alice and Bob and estimating the Eve-to-Bob distance. The chaining rule can also be leveraged to account for errors in estimating these delays.
Let m ¼ fm 1 ; . . . ; m V À1 g where m j ¼ i j À i 0 . First, Eve extends her jamming sequence by appending (cyclically postfixing) the first m V À1 jamming samples to this sequence. So for any candidate frame start time i j , the jamming signal will be fully superposed on Alice's three STSs because the jamming signal is cyclically extended already by m V À1 > m j samples. Next, Eve assumes that i 1 is the correct frame start. In this case, the superposition of the jamming signal on Alice's three STSs will be different from the previous case (i.e., the jamming sequence is slid with respect to Alice's STSs) and (12) is no longer sufficient to eliminate the last two channel-dependent terms within B in (9) . Instead, Eve can find pairs of yet free samples and, similar to the pairing rule, define one of the samples of each of such pairs based on the other sample of that pair and also the corresponding samples in r. After this step, half of the free samples will be given values. Eve repeats the same procedure for the rest of the frame start times and free samples. Based on these hierarchical dependencies among the samples u i , Eve constructs a binary chaining tree in which the dependency between two samples is mapped to a parentchild relationship. Note that an unassigned (free) sample may already have a chain of other dependent sample(s). The value of the dependents will be updated whenever that sample takes a new value.
An example is depicted in Fig. 7 with m ¼ f0; 1; 3; 4g. Without loss of generality, we assume Alice's preamble sequence is shifted instead of the jamming sequence.
The tree in this figure shows how the jamming samples are being chained together and used to construct the tree from the bottom to the top. A pair of free samples are considered as siblings. The left child specifies the value of its right sibling based on m j and then the left child is copied to its parent node. So the right child depends on its sibling. To explicitly define the dependency between the two sibling samples, all their dependent samples must also be taken into account because their values in (9) are affected by their parents' values. For example, when j ¼ 1, Eve may select two free samples u 1 and u 3 (together with their dependents u 2 and u 4 ) to eliminate the channeldependent terms:
which
Now the value of the dependent of u 3 (u 4 in this example) is updated to maintain its dependency relationship with the right sibling u 3 . 
10: end while 11: end for 12: Return u A pseudocode of the chaining rule, which also contains the pairing rule, is provided in Algorithm 1. The algorithm iterates for each m j , j ¼ 1; . . . ; V À 1. At each iteration and for each pair of free samples, the right subtree (the right siblings of all its 2 j À 1 dependents) is multiplied by a coefficient x (defined in line 8) such that the summation of the corresponding 2 j product terms in (9) and the 2 j terms corresponding to the left subtree is zero. The horizontal arrows in Fig. 7 show the dependence of the right subtrees on their left subtrees. As a result, L=2 j samples are assigned at each iteration and the algorithm terminates after V ¼ log 2 ðLÞ iterations. In the end, all but one of the samples (u 1 in our example) will be a right sibling at least once at some point in the tree and so are assigned. We call the remaining free sample the jamming seed, to which all the samples are chained either directly or recursively. The jamming seed can be used to control the jamming power.
Effects of LTSs on FO and Channel Estimation
LTSs are used for fine FO and channel estimation. As explained in Section 2, the phase offset from the LTS-based FO corresction perspective is between Àp and p, which means that the true FO after STS-based correction has to be between Àth l and th l . So LTSs can correct up to th l ¼ f D =2 FO, and any remaining phase offset will be an integer multiple of 2p, which corresponds to 2k th l ¼ kf D , k ¼ 1; 2; . . . . In other words, the LTSs at Bob round up the FO manipulated by g Df s to the nearest multiple of 2th l and avoid ICI by adjusting the subcarriers to the closest, though incorrect, frequency bins. Consequently, in this attack all the subcarriers will be shifted forward or backward, replacing neighboring subcarriers. Bob eventually demodulates the bits of all OFDM symbols, but he is unaware that these symbols have been shifted and misplaced. A simple example with four subcarriers is provided in Fig. 8 . Each subcarrier carries two bits (QPSK-modulated symbols). In the shifted version, two unknown bits are added in the beginning and the rest of the sequence is shifted to the right, although the bits are correctly demodulated. Therefore, when the bits of different OFDM symbols are concatenated to reconstruct the original bit sequence, the entire sequence will look shuffled and out-of-order compared to the original bit sequence. A shifted version of an arbitrary bit sequence will result in very high BER.
An STS-based FO estimation error also affects the channel estimation process, which is applied across the LTSs, specially if Bob estimates the channel irrespective to the outcome of the fine FO estimation. To elaborate, the phase offset accumulates over time, causing different LTS samples to have different phase offsets. However, Bob complacently tries to interpret this time-varying phase offset as a fixedvalue channel phasor by minimizing the MSE. Hence, his attempt to model the FO as if it is a channel parameter results in an incorrect estimated channel phasor, which after equalization rotates the payload's modulation symbols on the constellation map.
Optimal Jamming Strategy
(Optimal Jamming Sequence Design)
If the SJR at Bob is known, Eve can achieve the maximum possible j]CðF eb Þj value by optimally selecting jF eb j. This maximization allows Eve to inflict the maximum subcarrier shift and overcome possible FO estimation inaccuracies due to noise at Eve or Bob. To calculate the optimal jF eb j, we represent the total received jamming energy jũj 2 and signal energy jrj 2 in polar coordinates, as shown in Fig. 9 . Using geometric arguments, we find the maximum j]Cj, where C ¼ jrj 2 þ jũj 2 e ÀjðF eb Þ . Each circular contour in this figure shows the end points of the vector C for a given SJR but different F eb values.
As long as jũj < jrj, j]Cj reaches its maximum when the vector C is tangent to the contour circle. In a right triangle, this implies
and
When jũj ! jrj, the maximum ]C equals to p, which is always achieved when jF eb j ¼ p. In Fig. 10 , we plot the corresponding optimal jDf eb À Df ab j during the STSs for different SJR values.
Based on ]C, we also derive the resulting number of subcarrier-spacings shift after LTSs. Note that phase offsets p=2 and p correspond to FOs of one and two f D 's, respectively. From the STSs perspective, LTSs adjust a phase offset to its closest multiple of 2' l . So when j]Cj > 3' l , the attack results in a shift of two subcarriers. The jamming sequence can be designed to minimize the total jamming energy P LÀ1 i¼0 jũ i j 2 , subject to the constraint of at least one subcarrier shift, i.e., j]CðF eb Þj ! D' l . The shaded area in Fig. 9 shows the feasible region. According to (17) and the geometry in Fig. 9 , we conclude that:
1) The energy minimization problem is feasible as long as
2) The minimum jamming energy is achieved when
or equivalently, jDf eb À Df ab j ¼ 1:5 f D . Equation (20) says that the phase offset of Eve's signal as perceived by Bob should have phase difference of jp=2 þ D' l j relative to Alice's signal. Even if D' eb does not satisfy (20) , Eve can augment the hardware-dependent Df eb and obtain an effective Df eb by imposing an artificial FO of Df n on the jamming sequence before it is transmitted by the oscillator. This is achieved by multiplying the samples of the jamming sequence by e Àj2pDf n i t s , where Df n is given by:
The optimal jF eb j that minimizes the jamming energy is particularly important in designing the optimal jamming strategy because the SJR at Bob is usually unknown to Eve. The optimal jamming strategy to deal with this situation is to consider the worst-case (highest) SJR under which the attack is successful and then set the effective FO according to (20) . Therefore, Eve always sets F eb to AEðp=2 þ D' l Þ.
DISCUSSION
OFDM-based 802.11 systems employ interleaving and adaptive modulation and coding (AMC) schemes to increase resiliency against jamming and bit errors. However, the achieved BER value of the aforementioned FO attack ($ 0:5) is high enough that the mutual information between the transmitted and received sequences is zero, and hence practical coding schemes cannot recover the frame. After an unsuccessful transmission and subsequent data rate reduction, Alice may increase her transmit power for the whole frame. In the case of the proposed FO attack, such an increase is unnecessary and inefficient for the payload, which constitutes up to 99:9 percent of a frame. In addition, an intelligent jammer can track Alice's power increase (e.g., by overhearing management frames), adjust the jamming power to always achieve the optimal SJR, and force the dropping of subsequent transmissions. It may also be argued that because pilot subcarriers are transmitted on known frequencies, Bob can compare the known symbols of the pilot subcarriers with the received symbols on different subcarriers to identify a possible subcarrier shift. However, because channel estimation is distorted, locating the corrupted pilot subcarriers at Bob is quite challenging. Furthermore, these pilot subcarriers cannot be easily used for channel estimation (we leave the investigation of this problem to a future work).
Moreover, we note that jamming the LTSs after jamming the STSs strengthens the attack by further distorting the channel estimation process. However, jamming the LTSs alone cannot lead to a subcarrier shift even though it involves more jamming effort (8-ms duration on 48 subcarriers) than jamming three STSs ( 3 ms on 12 subcarriers). Furthermore, with LTSs jamming, pilot subcarriers can still be used to estimate the channel and correct any residual FO.
The system model in this paper assumes a single Tx-Rxpair (i.e., Alice and Bob, and hence their FO, are known). In the case of multiple Tx-Rx pairs, Eve can construct a database of the FOs between different Tx-Rx pairs. Benefiting from CSMA/CA channel access mechanism, Eve can consider one transmission at a time and then leverage protocol semantics (e.g., data-ACK exchanges) to guess the Tx and Rx of an upcoming transmission. Further investigation of this issue is left for future work.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the FO estimation attack through simulations and USRP experiments. We implemented the 802.11a/g preamble (including both short and long training sequences) by extending the PHYlayer library functions of LabVIEW. Alice appends 1;500 modulated random bits to the frame preamble. Pilot-based channel and FO estimation and channel coding were not implemented to concentrate on the specific effects of the FO attack on received uncoded bits. The impact of coding and pilot subcarriers was discussed in Section 5.
We assume that Bob uses the STSs t 9 and t 10 , as defined in Fig. 3 , for coarse FO estimation, followed by fine FO estimation using LTSs. Channel estimation is performed over the first LTS using the time domain method [13] . We first evaluate the performance under a simulated AWGN channel model and later in a multi-path indoor environment.
(More results are provided in [19] .) We vary the SJR, the SNR (noise level), the modulation scheme, and Eve's effective FO, denoted by D eb . In particular, we consider BPSK, QPSK, and 16-QAM modulation schemes. We measure g Df s as well as final estimated FO, SER, and BER.
We compare three cases: 1) jamming the last STSs with a random signal (see Section 4.2.1), 2) FO attack with pairing rule only (V ¼ 1 and L ¼ 16 for frame detection), and 3) the entire FO attack including the chaining rule, with L ¼ 16 and V ¼ log 2 L. The purpose of evaluating the second case is to study the impact of the chaining rule. The jamming duration for the second case is always equal to the sum of the durations of t 8 and t 9 . However, it is not constant when the chaining rule is applied, and depends on m V À1 .
Simulations
We consider an AWGN channel model without signal attenuation. In our simulations, the SJR is normalized to the energy of two full STSs. However, the chaining rule results in a variable-length cyclic postfix extension, which sometimes has a slightly higher sample power than the average sample power over an STS.
Frame Detection and Jamming Duration
Initially, we assess the accuracy of our adaptive fast frame detection method at Eve and also its impact on the jamming duration. Even though our adaptive detection method uses a small window of L ¼ 16 compared to L ¼ 48 for the default scheme, adapting based on finding V frame-start candidates increases the probability of precise frame detection even for the first candidate. This is shown in Fig. 11 , where each probability is calculated based on more than 25;000 runs. By including additional V À 1 candidate start times, we further increase the probability of including the true start time in V candidates, specially under high noise levels. The chaining rule benefits from V start times because it equally likely considers all the candidate start times to construct the jamming signal. The jamming duration depends on m V À1 and the amount of postfix extension. In Table 1 , we report the average index-distance between the first and the last samples (m V À1 ) in the set of V start times when an STS contains L ¼ 16 samples. The table shows that even at low SNR, the amount of cyclic extension due to the chaining rule is often less than half an STS. In particular, in 99:88 percent of the cases, m V À1 8, which means the jamming duration will be less than 3:5 STS or, equivalently, 0:7 of an OFDM-symbol duration. A 1; 500-bit BPSK-modulated payload lasts for 32 OFDM symbols, equivalent to 160 STS . The durations of 16-QAM-modulated and QPSK-modulated signals of the same payload will be 40 and 80 STS , respectively. So the jamming effort in our simulations is upper bounded by 2:0, 3:5, and 5:9 percent for BPSK, QPSK, and 16-QAM-modulated payloads, respectively. In general, an 802.11a frame lasts for 20 Â 10 À6 þ dð22 þ LENGTHÞ=DATARATEe seconds [2] , where LENGTH and DATARATE denote the encoded payload size (in bits) and the data rate, respectively. For a typical 802.11a frame [3] , the jamming effort varies between 0:07 and 0:88 percent, depending on the code and data rates. This is 30 percent less than the effort of the OFDM symbol jamming attack in [3] . Fig. 12a depicts the average g Df s , measured after the corrupted STSs of 150 frames, when SJR¼ 1:59 dB, transmission power is 0 dBm, and noise level is À25 dBm. The horizontal line represents th l , normalized to f D . The chaining rule improves the jamming effectiveness and guarantees a range of effective FO values for which the attack is successful ( f D' > D' l ). When the chaining rule is not applied, the jamming attack is optimal at the optimal effective FO derived in Section 4.4, but is still insufficient to pass the threshold because of frame detection errors. When the chaining rule with V candidates is applied, the maximum average f D' occurs later than the maximum for the no-chaining case because of slightly higher power during postfix samples. Fig. 12b shows the effect of noise on the STS-based estimated FO when SJR¼ 1:59 during the last three STSs and with D eb ¼ 1:52 f D , a near-optimal value for this setup. The 90 percent confidence intervals are shown for each point. The increase in frame timing errors due to noise reduces the effectiveness of the attack, but this increase has less impact when the chaining rule is applied. When the noise level is higher than À20 dBm, the gap between the curves belonging to the two modes of the FO attack is wider, showing that the chaining rule is more robust in highly noisy channels.
FO Estimation
When j f D'j > D' l , the LTSs round the estimated FO to the nearest multiple of 2th l . Otherwise, LTSs try to round the FO to zero. In Fig. 12c , we plot the average final estimated FO at Bob when SJR¼ 1:3 dB during the last three STSs and the noise level is À25 dBm throughout the frame. The chaining rule improves Eve's ability to shift the subcarriers by one f D . With respect to the SJR, we can observe in Fig. 12d that when Eve'e D eb is close to its optimal value, Eve is not able to guarantee a successful attack without the chaining rule even with the optimal SJR value of 1:5 dB.
Impact of the FO Attack on Modulation Performance
Under a relatively high SNR (e.g., 30 dB in our simulations) and without the FO attack, the SER is very close to zero. The FO attack impacts both the channel and FO estimations. We measure the overall impact for different modulation schemes by measuring the SER and BER. First, we consider the case when f D' < D' l and the LTSs are still able to correct the FO. In this case, Bob tries to minimize the error of estimating a channel phasor that is supposedly responsible for the phase shift accumulations over LTS samples. Because the phase shift D' ¼ 2pDft is linear in time, the best estimate is a phasor that equals to the average phase shifts. As long as j f D'j D' l (i.e., the resulting FO is still less than th l ), the maximum phase offset between the first and last samples in an LTS is p, which implies that the error in phasor estimation is always less than p=2. On the constellation map, This error will cause an identical rotation of all the payload's modulated samples [1] . We select to apply channel estimation to one LTS to limit the amount of rotation. Fig. 12e shows the SER for different modulation schemes. Clearly, BPSK is the most resilient scheme against channel phasor estimation error. Once j f D'j > D' l and the subcarriers are shifted, the sequence of modulated samples of any modulation scheme looks random relative to its original sequence, resulting in the highest possible SER, i.e., ðjMj À 1Þ=jMj, where jMj is the modulation order.
The BER under higher-order modulation schemes, however, is less affected by the attack if the subcarriers are not shifted but the symbols are rotated to neighboring regions, as shown in Fig. 12f . With the increase of D eb , first the BER of 16-QAM starts to increase due to symbol errors. However, once QPSK also experiences symbol errors, its BER will be larger than the one for 16-QAM. Because of the Gray code structure, higher-order modulations guarantee lower BER when one of the neighboring symbols is mistakenly demodulated instead of the true symbol. Nonetheless, as long as the FO attack shifts the subcarriers, the BER stays at its maximum (0:5), irrespective of the modulation scheme.
USRP Experiments
We experimentally evaluate the impact of the proposed FO attack using an NI-USRP 2922 testbed, operated in an indoor environment in the 2:4 GHz band and controlled by Windows-based hosts. Our setup consists of three USRPs, acting as Alice, Bob, and Eve. To estimate the FOs between the USRPs, we connected Alice and Eve devices to Bob through an SMA cable and conduct 4; 000 FO estimations. Df ab and Df eb were measured to be 1; 086 and 340 Hz with standard deviations of 270 and 230 Hz, respectively. Based on the estimated FOs, effective FO D eb was approximately found to be 715:5 þ Df n Hz with standard deviation of 355 Hz. In our experiments, we fix the locations of Alice and Bob and move Eve to create two scenarios: LOS and non-LOS (see Table 2 ). In the non-LOS case, a metal shelf is placed between Eve and the other two. At each location, Eve launches the attack with different jamming powers and different values of Df n . In the experiments, Alice's transmission power is set to 7:9 dBm.
The USRP-based implementation of our reactive attack faced two challenges. First, the internal buffer size of the USRPs, which is used to store the samples before forwarding them to the host PC, is not big enough to store the samples captured at the nominal rate of 20 MHz. So we had to reduce the symbol rate to 0:2 MSPS. As a consequence, STS expanded to 80 ms and f D dropped to 3; 125 Hz (i.e., the total bandwidth of 200 kHz). Second, the USRP's reaction time (which consists of the communication delay between a USRP and its host PC through an Ethernet cable, the host's processing delay, and the time to initialize for transmission) exceeded several milliseconds. So Eve will miss the rest of the frame before she starts her jamming. 6 To overcome these challenges, we made the following modification in the implementation. We let Alice send several back-to-back frames periodically with a known period of T ms. Upon being triggered by a received power increase, Eve captures 2 ms worth of the sequence. If a frame is detected, she assumes that the next frame starts exactly T ms after the start of the this one. The host PC at Eve then constructs a jamming signal based on the timing information of the first detected frame and sends it to the USRP. After initialization, the USRP's onboard timer, which has nanosecond accuracy, waits for the remaining time before the next frame arrival. Once the timer expires, the device starts jamming the preamble of the new frame and other subsequent frames. Fig. 13a shows the average STS-based estimation of Df ab in the LOS scenario for different values of Df n and jamming powers. Because our USRPs do not have stable oscillators and hence Df ab varies with time, we represent the probable value of Df ab þ f D =2 by a shaded area whose height is twice the standard deviation of Df ab . Eve is able to shift the subcarriers by pushing g Df s beyond the actual value of Df ab þ f D =2. The results show that even though Eve-Bob distance is larger than Alice-Bob distance, Eve can shift the subcarriers using almost the same power as Alice's power if Df n is optimally selected. In particular, when the jamming signal is 7:95 dBm, Eve is successful in shifting the subcarreirs in 84 percent of the attacks if Df n ¼ 5; 500 Hz. This validates our optimal Df n selection scheme (see Section 4.4) since the "estimated" optimal Df n in our setup is 715:5 þ 4; 687:5 ¼ 5; 403 Hz. After STSs, 6. This is not the case for an off-the-shelf reactive jammer, which usually has an onboard processor and dedicated hardware. In addition, implementing a correlation-based reactive jammer on the USRP's FPGA can achieve a reaction time of 2:56 ms [20] .
LTS-based estimation rounds the FO to the nearest multiple of f D . In Fig. 13b , we depict a histogram to show/compare the number of jamming attacks that result in different ranges of FO estimates at Bob, before and after LTS-based estimation. It shows how LTSs can complacently exacerbate the FO estimation error. We show the results for the NLOS scenario in Fig. 14a . As seen in this figure, the lower the jamming power, the smaller is the optimal value of Df n , which is inline with Fig. 10 .
In the above results, we notice that the 95 percent confidence intervals at higher Df n values are noticeably larger than those at smaller Df n values. According to Fig. 9 , higher values of effective Df eb may result in estimating a negative FO (when ]C > p) and thus the variance of g Df s increases. A negative FO estimate results in forward subcarrier shifts, instead of backward shifts. To illustrate this behavior, in Fig. 14b we plot the impact of Df n on the amount of subcarrier shift when the jamming power is 14:2 dBm. The attack achieves the highest success rate when Df n ¼ 5; 800 Hz. As Df n increases further, the success rate slightly decreases, but Eve can impose various amounts of subcarrier shift, which can be leveraged to make it more difficult for Bob to guess the amount of subcarrier shift. Fig. 14c shows the effect of jamming power on the amount of subcarrier shift when Df n is high. As the jamming power increases, Eve not only can achieve a higher success rate, but can also impose more than one subcarrier shift (forward or backward).
We compare the FO attack, with and without the chaining rule, against a random FO jammer in Fig. 14d . In this experiment, we configure Eve's USRP to start jamming zero, one, or two time indices before the estimated start of STSs. The random FO jammer generates uniform white noise. The results confirm that the chaining rule strengthens the attack while random jamming cannot manipulate Df s and overcome the LTSs even with high jamming power.
Finally, we launch the FO attack during the transmission of a packetized image. Specifically, Eve attacks 24 packets in the middle of the transmission of 44 QPSK-modulated 720-byte-long packets that represent the image in Fig. 15a . In  Fig. 15b , we show the received image. The parts that experience FO jamming are completely destroyed.
DEFENSE STRATEGIES
Alice and Bob may work cooperatively or independently to mitigate the previously presented FO attack. For example, they may prevent accurate estimation of Df ab at Eve by transmitting Tx-based friendly jamming. This, however, requires additional antennas. Bob may also use the powerspectral density of the captured signal after LTSs to identify the missing subcarriers, and thus determine the overall subcarrier shift. This technique, however, fails if Eve transmits only one or two bogus subcarriers to replace missing subcarriers. Assuming that Bob is not equipped with additional antennas, we propose three preliminary approaches for mitigating the FO attack. Analysing and evaluating these strategies are beyond the scope of this paper, and will be addressed in future research.
1) Randomizing FO Sequences (Sequence Hopping): Because of the redundancy in the STSs, Bob can choose any pair of the 10 consecutive STSs, to perform FO estimation. Furthermore, due to the maximum FO requirement for 802.11 devices (212 kHz ¼ 1:3568 th s for devices operating in the 5 GHz band and 125 kHz ¼ 0:8 th s for devices in the 2:4 GHz band [17] ), the two autocorrelation windows do not necessarily need to be contiguous. In fact, the two windows can be two or four STSs apart (i.e., each sample is three or five STSs away from its dual) in the 5 and 2:4 GHz bands, respectively. This means that Bob has the flexibility to randomly hop to any pair of STSs for FO estimation, given that the STSs in this pair are not more than two or four STSs apart, depending on the frequency band. Even if Bob selects an STS that is corrupted by a jamming signal together with a jamming-free one, he is still able to estimate the same FO as if two jamming-free sequences are selected [1] . To implement sequence hopping, Bob can record the received signal (the 10 STSs) while he is in the process of detecting the start of the frame. Once the frame has been detected, Bob randomly chooses two STSs for FO estimation, while satisfying the maximum STS-distance constraint.
2) Preamble Obfuscation: Preamble obfuscation aims at making the timing or FO features hard to extract by Eve. We provide one simple example for timing extraction. Alice can obfuscate the preamble by adding artificial noise that is only known to Bob. He, on the other side, modifies the denominator in (6) to account for the power of the artificial noise during a certain section of the received signal. For example, a signal identical to the first half of an STS may be added to the first half of the second STS in the preamble. So, Bob can still detect the frame by doubling the denominator in (6), but the increased power at Eve would decrease the value of MðnÞ through (6) for the first L=2 samples. Hence, M will be in the second half, making the chaining rule fail because Eve does not include the actual start time in the V ¼ log 2 L start times.
3) STS Bypassing: Bob can simply disable the STS-based FO estimation mechanism to dodge the FO attack. However, he still has to meet the requirement for coarse FO estimation, i.e., unambiguous phase estimation (see Section 2.1). Under BPSK modulation, which is typically used to transmit the PHY header, Bob can tolerate channel estimation errors due to an FO estimation error of up to 15 kHz [13] . Hence, Bob can divide the range of possible FO values into several equal-size frequency bins, each of 30 kHz bandwidth. He can then try each of the possible bins and compensate for its center frequency before applying LTS-based FO estimation. The center frequency that results in the minimum MSE in channel estimation can be considered as g Df s . Bob may also suppress both STS-and LTS-based FO estimation, and instead rely on pilot subcarriers for FO and channel estimation. This approach, however, often gives rise to ICI because adjacent subcarriers interfere with the pilot subcarriers (which even are not yet channel-equalized) and the FO estimation will be erroneous.
RELATED WORK
Vulnerabilities of wireless protocols and Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have been studied in the literature since the early 2000s. DoS attacks can be applied at either MAC or PHY-layer. MAC layer attacks usually take the form of malicious packet insertion. For example, in the deauthentication deadlock attack [21] , a specific packet is injected at a particular time during the EAPOL four-way handshake of 802.11, leading to DoS. In contrast, RF jamming is a form of PHYlayer attack.
RF Jamming techniques are categorized into constant, deceptive, random, reactive, and short noise-based (narrowband) intelligent jamming methods [4] , [22] . Constant, deceptive, and random jamming models achieve a high level of DoS by excessively transmitting over the channel, but exhibit poor energy efficiency and high detection probability [22] . On the other hand, energy-efficient reactive jamming attacks select and target a (part of a) packet based on traffic analysis, protocol semantics, or publicity of some fields [3] , [4] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [20] . These attacks may fail to significantly corrupt ongoing transmissions if, for example, channel hopping, randomization, and coding are used to hide the transmission features.
The efficiency of reactive jamming is assessed by the effort needed to drop a packet. In [3] , jamming efficiency is defined as the ratio of communication effort to jamming effort. The authors demonstrated the jamming efficiency of 50 $ 500 in 802.11a by jamming an OFDM symbol. Using a high duty-cycle jammer, Gummadi et al. [9] could disrupt a link when the jamming power is 1;000 weaker than the signal power by targeting timing recovery, dynamic range selection (AGC), and header processing. The authors in [23] observed that 22 ms of jamming is sufficient to make a frame undecodable. In comparison, our FO attack can achieve a jamming efficiency of 136 $ 1400 in 802.11a and defeat any ECC by jamming for only 2:8 ms.
Jamming OFDM systems is of particular interest due to their widespread use in modern systems. Simple barrage jamming targets the entire spectrum/tones and corrupts more bits than the more power efficient but less destructive partial band, single-and multi-tone jamming [7] , [24] . Asynchronous off-tone jamming attacks exploit the uncompensated FO between Eve and Bob to transmit one or multiple subcarriers that will be received between some of the data subcarriers [7] . This creates significant ICI for those subcarriers. Though energy-efficient, these attacks cannot achieve 50 percent BER. Furthermore, because coding and interleaving are employed in the 802.11 systems for robustness against narrow-band interference, Bob may still be able to recover the frame. Several pilot jamming attacks were proposed in [6] , [7] in order to distort channel estimation. In contrast, our proposed attack lasts for less than the duration of a pilot symbol jamming and corrupts the channel estimation without jamming pilots. Jamming against timing acquisition in OFDM systems and some countermeasures were discussed in [8] , [11] , [12] . However, OFDM systems are more sensitive to FO than timing errors. This vulnerability was first revealed in [10] . The structured but essentially random jamming scheme in [10] , however, does not provide any performance guarantee and may have higher jamming effort than ours. Interested readers are referred to [19] , [25] for more details about jamming attacks against OFDM systems.
CONCLUSION
We demonstrated the vulnerability of OFDM systems against a highly disruptive but efficient-efficient DoS attack. This attack succeeds even when the PHY frame is shielded by interleaving and channel coding. The attack focuses on the frequency offset estimation process, and is channelindependent and robust to time-synchronization errors at Eve through applying the proposed pairing and chaining rules. Through this attack, a reactive jammer exploits and targets a small portion of the publicly known preamble used for FO estimation. The attack lasts for less than the duration of an OFDM symbol, i.e., less than 1 percent of a typical frame duration, and is at least 30 percent more efficient than previously reported attacks. Though short-lived, the attack results in a shift in subcarrier indices and the maximum possible BER (50 percent) even when the jamming signal at Bob is $ 1:4 times weaker than Alice's signal. We verified via simulations and USRP experimentation. The simulation results show that different modulation schemes are equally susceptible if the FO attack can shift the subcarrier indices, and higher modulation orders are more affected when the attack impacts only the channel estimation. Finally, we sketched several possible mitigation approaches, whose detailed analysis and evaluation are left for future.
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